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Abstract
In this paper, I propose a semantic framework of the theory for cooperative dialogues in [18]. This frame-
work is called SCD (Semantics of Cooperative Dialogues). It consists of a combination of DRT (Discourse
Representation Theory) [2, 11, 13] and the Situation Semantics [5]. It also concludes a revision algorithm of
shared belief in dialogues. Then I present some formal properties of SCD: possible situations, belief-sharing
and self-referential part, and ontology of discourse referents. Next, some linguistic applications of SCD are
discussed: negation and denial, Quantifying-In, Hob-Nob sentence, and Conway paradox.
1 Introduction
The semantics of cooperative dialogues must satisfy
the following conditions:
(1) 1. partiality
2. multi-model
3. model transformation
1. should capture the epistemic partiality of par-
ticipants of dialogues. For this, I make use of DRT
(Discourse Representation Theory) [11, 13, 2] at
the syntactic level, and Situation Semantics [5] at
the semantic level.
Participants of dialogues are indicated with a, b.
An utterance can be differently interpreted by a
and b. And their interpretations can be different
from the fact. To explain this, I assume the model
of a, b, and the fact. (Cf. [15, 17].)
The semantic status of a dialogue changes along
with a series of utterances. 3. explains the dynamic
feature of dialogues.
I call the present framework Semantics of Co-
operative Dialogues (SCD). In SCD, an utterance
made by a participant is transformed into the cor-
responding logical formula, and added to the condi-
tions in Discourse Representation Structure (DRS).
DRS is interpreted in the situation-semantically
constructed model to explain the semantic char-
acter of the dialogue.
An utterance transforms DRST, to DRSn-f-l• In
this sense, it is a function which maps DRST, to
DRS.+i.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Syntax
2.1.1 Language £
The syntax of DRSs and the language for DRSs
is defined as follows.
Vocabulary The vocabulary Voc(r) of £ con-
sists of the following elements:
(i) Set of individual constants Con(1) 9
a, b, c,• • • , r (sometimes with indices).
(ii) Set of individual variables Var(r) 3 x,y,z
(sometimes with indices).
(iii) Set of n(> 0)-ary predicates Predn (r) pl
Set of predicates Pred(L) =UnPredn.
(iv) logical connectives	 V, A,	 .
(v) quantifiers V, 3.
If £ is obvious, Con(r), Var(r), Predn(r),
Pred(r) are abbreviated to Con,Var, Predn,
Pred respectively. (Likewise Form(r), DRS(r)
below.)
Set of terms Term = Con U Var.
The elements of Pred are normally denoted using
mnemonics 'walk' etc.
Pred2 contains Bel', `='.
Formation Rules The class of £ formulas
Form(L) is the greatest class such that if p E
Form(r), then p is one of the following forms':
als U (a) , and, of these individuals, believes that
C
Exp(L) = Voc(L)UForm(L)UDRS(L) is called
the class of expressions of L.
2.1.3 DRS of dialogues
The epistemic status of a dialogue by a, b at a time
point i is illustrated as follows:
K(fi): a, b, c1, C2, C3, •••       
A(ci ), B(c2 ), C (c3),
K(a):	 K(b): 
< domain > a, b, di , d2,...
< S RP > K(a, b)
<IKSP>
d 1 = d2
< EKSP>,
B el(a, p)
Bel(b,p)
Bel(a, q)
< domain > a, b, ci , c2 , c3,
< background knowledge >
rank() • 	
rankl • 	
rank2 • 	
K(a, b):
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(i) If a l , • • • a,, E Term, then Xi E Predn\{Bell,
Prii ( ct i, • • • an) E Form.
(ii) If a E Term, p E Form, then Bela, p) E
Form.
(iii) If p, q E Form, then
(p V q), (p A q), (p	 q),	 q) E Form.
(iv) If a E Var, p E Form, then Vap, Sap E
Form.
In obvious cases, parentheses in (p V q), (p A q),
(p	 q) are omitted.
q),	 E q) abbreviate (- 'p V q), (p	 q) A
(q	 p) respectively.
=	 a2) are normally designated by a l
 = a2
The elements of Form(L) without free variables
are called sentences, and their class are denoted by
Sent(L).
2.1.2 Discourse Representation Structure
The class of discourse representation structures
DRS(L) constructed from £ is the greatest class
such that if DRS(L) E DRS(L), DRS(L) is the
following form:
If a E Term, CK(c) C Form U DR-S(4 UK(a)
is the set of individual constants and variables in
C K(c,), then < K(a); CR-(,) > E DRS
(L).
The discourse representation structure DRS <
K(a); U K (c,), C K (a) > is also designated by K(a)=
< Uma,),CK(a)>, and K(a) represents the DRS.
K(a) is called the label of DRS or simply the
DRS. UK(a) is called the domain of DRS, its ele-
ments are called discourse referents (drs). The set
of drs are designated by DR. C K(c) are called the
condition part of K(a), its elements are called con-
ditions of K(a). Conditions which are elements of
Form are called simple conditions, those which are
elements of DRS complex conditions, and they are
designated by SimpC lo co and CompCK(a)
 
respec-
tively. SimpCm co U CompCK(a)
 = C K(a). The set
of vocabulary in K(a) is designated by V oc(K (a)).
If K(a) 3 • • • 3 K(/3), K(a) is called the super-
DRS of K(0), and K(j3) a subDRS of K(a). A
subDRS K(7) of K(a) such that there is no K(0)
such that K(a) 3 • K(/3) 3 • • • K('y) is called an
immediate subDRS of K(a), and K(a) the immedi-
ate superDRS of K(7). If K(a) has no superDRSs,
K(a) is called the starting DRS.
If there is a sequence of immediate subDRSs
K(a0), • • • , K(an-1), K(an) starting with K(a0),
K(an) is also designated by Kao...an—i(an) or
K(a0 • • • an-lan)
The intuitive meaning of K(a) is that the epis-
temic subject a has the ontololgy of individu-
Fig. 1
K(fi) represents the epistemic status at the time
point i of an abstract individual f. K(fi) consists
of the domain UK(fi) = {a, b, c2 , c3 , ...}, and
the condition part Ch-cfo. Clop) consists of sim-
ple conditions A(c i ), B(c2 ), C(C3), ..., and complex
conditions K(a), K(b), which represent the epis-
temic status of a and b.2
Let one of the participants of a dialogue be rep-
resented by a, the other by j3. Then K(a) has the
following internal structure:
K(a):
Fig. 2
The rank in the background knowledge repre-
sents a's certainty of it. Rank 0 has the highest
certainty.
K(a, b) abbreviates K(a) and K(b) with the
same domain and conditions.
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SRP (Self-referential Part) represents the infi-
nite embedding of shared belief for a. E.g., K(a)
contains the correspondence of the following state-
ments:
(2) a believes that d 1 = d2.
a believes that b believes that d 1
 = d2.
IKSP (Implicit Knowledge Sharing Part) consists
of the conditions which a assumes are the common
knowledge between a and O.
An utterance of a (/3) is transformed into the
corresponding first-order formula p, and added
to EKSP (Explicit Knowledge Sharing Part) in
the form Bel(a,p) (Bel(0,p)). I.e., Bel(a,p)
(Bel(0,p)) is a shared belief between a and Q. But
p isn't, until her partner agrees to p so that p be-
comes a shared belief and a condition of EKSP.
2.2 Semantics
2.2.1 Model structure
MS =< Red, Ind, Par, Pol > is called a model
structure.
Rel: set of relations,
Ind: set of individuals,
Par: set of parameters,
Pol: {0,1}	 (set of polarities).
Rel = UT, Re ln . Re ln is called a set of n(> 0)
place relations. Re ln consists of n place relations
Re1 1 contains 'Via', `3a' (a E Par). Re12 con-
tains 'Bel', 'V', 'A', `E'. They are called spe-
cial relations, their set is represented by SpecRel.
Re12 contains
The universe of hypersets3 with the set of atoms
Rel U Ind U Par U Pol is called the class of enti-
ties of the model structure MS, and represented
by ENT(MS).
If for two model structures MS1 , MS2 , Re1 1 D
Re12 ,Indi D Ind2 , Pari D Pare, MS1 is called a
super-model structure of MS2 , MS2 a sub-model
structure of MS1.
2.2.2 Infon, situation, truth, and parame-
ter
The class of infons and situations are defined in a
simultaneous co-inductive manner as follows:
Infon The class of infons Inf is the largest class
such that if inf E Inf, then inf is one of the
following form:
If reli E Rel"\SpecRel, 	 ,	 an, E Ind U
Par, pol E Pol, then <	 an; pol >E
Inf.
If E Ind U Par, a E Par, in	 E f ,
pol E Pol, then
< Va,	 >,
< inh;pol >,
V ,infi , inf2 ;pol >,
< A, infi ,inf2 ;pol >,
fi ,in f2 ;pol >,
• in f1, inf2;Pol >,
< Bel, T, in f; pol >E Inf."
The infon inf with the inverted polarity of in f is
called the conjugate of inf.
Situation The set of situations Sit =P(Inf).
Parameters If Q E {V, 3}, a E Par, Qa is called
the quantificational relation. For an occurence of a
in in f , if Qa occurs in in f along the construction of
in f from the occurence of a upwards, the occurence
of a is in the scope of the first occurence of such
Qa. And the occurence of such an a is called the
bound parameter of inf. If a doesn't occur in the
scope of any Qa, the occurence of the a is called a
free parameter of inf.
If in f contains no free parameters, in f is called
a pure infon, and its class is represented by
Pure(Inf). If in f contains free parameters, inf
is called a parametrized infon, and its class is rep-
resented by Par(Inf).
Likewise, the class of pure situations Pure(Sit),
parametrized situations ParSit are defined.
Pure(Inf)UPar(Inf) =In f ,
Pure(Sit) U Par(Sit) = Inf.
If a is a free parameter or an individual in in f ,
the result of replacing all occurences of a with a E
Ind U Par is represented by in fa , and is called the
(a, a)-variant of inf.
Truth in f is true in the situation s iff in f E s.
	It's esignat d as s	 inf.
inf is false in the situation s iff inf	 s It's
designated as s in f
s	 in f (s in f) is also called that s supports
(does not support) inf.
2.2.3 Constraints on situations
In the following, i, j, k E Ind U Par, a E Par,
in f,inh,inf2 E Inf, s,t, u E Sit
Consistent situation The situation s which sat-
isfies the following condition is called a consistent
situation:
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(3) For an arbitrary infon inf , it's not the case
that inf, inf E s.
Contradictory situation The situation s which
satisfies the following condition is called a contra-
dictory situation:
(4) There is some infon inf such that inf, inf E s.
Basic situation The situation s which satisfies
the following condition is called a basic situation:
(5) (i) s =< Bel, i, in f; 1 >a s(sit(i)) in f
s =< Bel, i, in f; 0 >a s(sit(i)) 10 in f
sit(i) is the situation which corresponds to
i, is normally abbreviated to i. si is the sit-
uation i from the viewpoint of s. (Likewise
for sij etc.)
(ii) For s* ,u* E Sit*, s* ttu*	 in f	 s* tu*
inf
Reduction axiom (5ii) means that 'a believes
that a believes that p.' is identified with 'a be-
lieves that p.', which is formulated by the following
reduction axiom:
For a E Term, p E Form,
Bel(a, Bel(a,p))	 Bel(a,p).
Canonical situation The basic situation s
which satisfies the following condition is called a
canonical situation:
(6) (i) s = in f a inf E {inf' I A s < inf'}
	(ii) s	 Va, inf; 1 >a for all a E Ind, s
in fa
	
s 	 Va, in f ; 0	 for an a E hid, s
in Lc,'
	
s	 3a, in f; 1	 for an a E Ind, s
in fa
	
s 	 3a, in f; 0 >a for all a E Ind, s
infa
	(iv) s	 i; 1
 >
j;	 S H<=, j, i; >
1 >, s	 j, k;1	 s
k;1 >.
	
s	 j; 1 >, s	 in f	 s
(6i) means that the canonical situation s is a fil-
ter with the generator n s. So the canonical situa-
tion has the following property:
( 7 ) ( i ) s	 A, in fi ,in f2 ; 1	 s	 in	 and
s	 in f2,
s	 A, infi , inh; 0	 S	 Or s L
in f2.
(ii)) s H< V, in	 in f2 ; 1	 s	 in	 or s
inf2,
s H< V, infi ,inf2 ; 0 >a s	 in f , and
s	 in f2.
(iii) s =< A,  in 	 inf2 ; o ><#.
s =< V, in inh; 1 >,
s	 V , in 	 in f2 ; o >44*
s	 A, in in f2 ; 1 >.	 (de Morgan)
(iv)) s	 A, in	 in f2 ; l ><#.
s	 A, in f2 , in fi ; 1 >,
S v,	 in f2 ; >44.
s =< V, inf2 , in fi >. (Commutativity)
(v)	 inh, in i2; >,
S in fi
	s inf2.	 (Modus Pollens)
In the following, I consider only canonical situa-
tions.
Collapse axiom
(8) For a E Term, p E Form,
Bel(a, p) –+ p
is called the collapse axiom.
The situation s such that
< Bel, a, in f;1 > , in f ; 1 >
is called a collapsed situation.
2.2.4 Model
M =< MS, f > is a model of DRS. f is a par-
tial function from Exp(C) into Ent(MS) defined
as follows:
(9)	 For V oc(C):
(i) If a E Con, then f (a) E Ind.
(ii) If E Var, then f	 E Par.
(iii) If pred7i2 E Predn , then f(pred7) = req..
(For T E Term(L) U Pred(G), f(r) is nor-
mally represented by T.
(10)	 For Form(L):
(i) For a i ,	 an E Term,
137 E Pred"\{Bel},
P ril ( all • • * I an) E Form,
f (p i ( ct i, • • • an)) =
< f(P7), f(ai),• • ,f(a.);1>.
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(ii) For p, q E Form,	 (pV q), (pAq), (p --+ q),
q) E Form,
f	 = f (p), f (pV q)	 V, f (p), f (q), 1 >,
f(p A q )  ) =< A, f (p), (q); 1 >,
f(p	 q)	 pp), f (q); 1 >,
f(p EE q)	 f (p), f (q); 1 >.
(iii) For a E
	 p E Form, Vap, Bap E Form,
f (Vap) =< V f (a), Pp); 1 >,
f (3aP) =<	 AP); 1 >.
(iv) For a E Term,p E Form,
Bel(a,p) E Form,
f(Bel(a,p) =:‹ f (Bel), f (a), f f(&) (p); 1 >.
(f f(co is the interpretation function of
Mi(ck).)
(11) For TYRS(r):
For a E Term, K(a) E DRS(C)
f(K(a))	 Ma, sit(a), .(Ki)} iEN
( fc, FDR is the restriction
of fa 's domain to DR.)
fa is a bijection such that MC onUUK(c)] =
Ind
fa is a bijection such that MV arUU loco] =
Pare
sit(a) is the minimal canonical situation
such that
sit(a)	 f« (c) c E SimpCK(a)}.
Ki is an immediate subDRS of K(a).
If K(a) contains a series of embedded subDRSs,
the above interpretation produces a series of subin-
terpretations and subsituations fa , f f 0,, • • •;
a, a/3, ai37, • • • . As in (5ii), fs*ttu. and s*ttu* are
identified with fe t u. and s*tu*.
The interpretation of a dialogue at the time point
i is given by f(K(fi)).
2.3 Revision of DRS
The DRS and the situation it represents is dynam-
ically changed by a series of utterances. The algo-
rithm is formulated as follows:5
(12)
(i) (ia) If a utters P at K(fi), then Bel(a,p) is
added to EKSP of K fia,(a,b), and K fio(a,b).
If necessary, a and /3 add to their IKSPs the
conditions of which a and /3 think as mutual
knowledge respectively. With the resulting DRS
K(fi 1), the dialogue is terminated, or goes on
the the next stage. (I.e., a doesn't tell a lie, nor
say a contradiction of her belief.)
(ib) If utters P in K(fi), then a constructs
K(fi 1) by the same procedure as (ia), and
executes (ii).
(ii) a constructs K 11+ 1 (a') which is K114-1 (a) with
the collapse axiom in CKfi+,(0)-
(iia) If the situation fi-Fla' is consistent, the dia-
logue terminates with K(fi + 1) (i.e., K(fi) with
Bel(13,p) in EKSP of Kfia (a, b) and K fio(a,b)),
or goes on to the next stage.
(iib) In case the situation fi la' is contra-
dictory, if a finds the certainty of Bel(f3,p)
lower than her IKSP or background knowledge,
then a tries to abolish Bel(0,p) in Kfi+io.(a, b)
and Kfi+ 1 ,3 (a, b). If it succeeds, the dialogue
terminates with K(fi + 2) (i.e., K(fi + 1)
without Bel(f3,p) in EKSP of K fi .ficja,b) and
Kfi+ i p(a, b), or goes on to the next stage. Oth-
erwise, do (iic).
(iic) Insofar as there's a candidate q for consis-
tency recovery in IKSP of K fi+ 1 (a'), a tries to
abolish q in Kfi+ 1 ,(a, b) and Kfi+ i p(a, b). If it
succeeds, the dialogue terminates with K(f i + 2)
which is K (f i 1) without q in Kfi+ ia (a, b) and.
Kfi+ 10 (a, b), or goes on to the next stage. Oth-
erwise, do (iid).
(iid) n := 2. ( I') Insofar as there's a candi-
date q for consistency recovery in the background
knowledge of Kf1+ 1 (a'), a tries to abolish q in
Kfi+ i , (a, b) and K fi+ i p(a,b).
 If it succeeds,
the dialogue terminates with K (fi + 2) which
is K(fi 1) without q in the background knowl-
edge of Kfi+ ia,(a, b) and K fi+ i p(a,b), or goes
on to the next stage. Otherwise, n := n — 1. If
n = 0, the dialogue fails. Otherwise, go to (iid*).
3 Some properties of SCD
3.1 possible situations
SCD considers only canonical situations, and they
satisfy (5ii). So, only the situations fi(a)(ba)* ,
f i(b)(ab)* are possible.
3.2 Shared belief
If both Bel(a,p) and Bel(b,p) are added to EKSP,
then it is semantically equal to adding p. It's cer-
tified as follows:
Due to 3.1 and the existence of SRP in
Kfi& (a,b), if p is added to EKSP, the situations
which support f(p) are reduced to
(13) (a)b(ab)* , (b)a(ba)*	 i on the top is omit-
ted.)
On the other hand, if Bel(a,p) and Bel(b,p) are
added to EKSP, the situations which support f(p)
are reduced to
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p
••.
b,
K (b):
a, •••
K(a):
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(14) (a)b(ab)* a, (b)a(ba)* a.
(a)b(ab)*b, (b)a(ba)*b.
But this is reduced to
(15) (a)b(ab)* a C (b)a(ba)* ,
(b)a(ba)* a = (b)a(ba)*.
(a)b(ab)*b = (a)b(ab)* ,
(b)a(ba)*b C (a)b(ab)*.
I.e., (13) and (15) are equivalent, which gives a
semantic foundation of the Axiom of Shared Belief
in [18].
3.3 DRS and belief sentences
(10iv), (11) reveal that DRSs and belief sen-
tences can be semantically identified. In particu-
lar, < U, {Bel(a,p)} > equals < U, K(a) >, where
K(a) .< ,p >.
3.4 Negation and denial
In SCD, the negation and the denial of a statement
p are distinguished from each other as follows:
(16) negation: Bel(a,--,p),
denial: -,Bel(a,p)6
The distinction is semantically explained as follows:
(17) E.g., let p be `tualk(j)', i.e., the DRS condition
corresponding to 'John walks.' Then:
s	 (Bel(a, -1)))
s	 Bel, a, fa (--ip); 1 >
44*
 sa
	 fa(P)
=> sa =< walk, j; 0 >.
s	 f (-,Bel(a,p)) 
s f f(Bel(a,p))
s	 Bel, a, fe,(p); 0 >
.4* saf:< walk, j; 1 >.
I.e., Bel(a, -,p) means that a explicitly asserts that
John doesn't walk, but ---,Bel(a,p) means that a
doesn't know that John walks (and that he doesn't
walk, too).
3.5 Disjunction in canonical situa-
tions
Canonical situations have the following property
(cf. [16, 22]):
(18) s	 V,inf1,inf2,1	 s	 infi , or s
in f2.
It explains a semantic intuition about disjunction
in natural language. E.g.: John put his passport in
one of the drawers a, b of his desk. But their locks
are broken, and he cannot remember the drawer
with the passport in it. Then he cannot identify
the drawer, although it's certain that the passport
is either in a or b.
4 Linguistic applications of
SCD
4.1 Ontology of discourse referents
In the folloging DRS, a in UK(fi) and a in UK(b)
are different:
K(fi):
Fig.3
The former is the individual a in the factual situ-
ation, the latter is a in K (b) in the factual K(a).
In order to distinguish them in K(fi), the latter
is designated by the "relative path" from K(fi) as
aba. Although a and aba are different, fi can iden-
tify both of them in her ontology, which generally
means that UK contains every discourse referents
(for short: drs) of its subDRSs. 7
 drs which stem
from subDRSs of K are called subdrs of K, those
proper to K are called proper drs of K.
On the other hand, a isn't totally different from
aba, but aba is a counterpart of a, which is formu-
lated as the DRS condition c-part(a,aba).
In the following, a, 0, E DR (set of drs),
T, v, x E DR*, i, j, k E Ind, then the relation c-part
has the following syntactic and semantic properties:
(19) a E UK(,,) and va E UK(T) are notational
variants of the same dr.
If a E UK(„), then va E UK(T).
If c-part(a, 13) E Ch- ( , ) , then a E UK(„) ,
 3 E
UR-(„x).
(20) a) s 1<c-part,i,i; 1 >
	
(Reflexivity)
b) s =<c-part,i,j; 1 >,
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ort;ntbh,msb
Ortcutt(ort)
Repr(ort,mbh)
Repr(ort, msb)
spy(ort)
K(r): Mbh, msb;
= msb)
spy(mbh)
--,spy(msb)
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s =<c-part,j,k; 1
	
s <c-part,i, k; 1	 >.	 (Transitivity)
But it's not the case that
s =<c-part,i, j; 1
s =<c-part,j,i; 1 > (Symmetry),
because a of K(a) can identify its counterpart in
its subDRSs, but no vice versa.
Next, we consider a notational problem of drs
in the couterpart relation. If a E UK(T ) and a E
UK(„) correspond 1:1, i.e.:
(21) ye E UK( Tv),( E	 :
c-part(a, va), c-part(a, E CK(T)
va =,
c-part(a, va), c-part((, va) E CK(T)
a =
there's no problem. But in (22), an individual splits
up in two individuals, and in (23), two individuals
merge together to one individual:
(22) Ralph believes that a man in a brown hat is
a spy. On the other hand, he doesn't believe
that a man seen at the beach is not a spy. But
in fact, they are one and the same man called
Ortcutt. [20, 14]
(23) Bill knows Claire, a university student. But
in fact, he believes that the twins Claire and
Anna are one and the same person called
Claire.
Let K(r), K (bill) be the DRSs which repre-
sent the epistemic status of Ralph and Bill re-
spectively. Then we index the above-mentioned
drs in K(r), K (bill): ortl, ort2, cll, or designate
them with mnemonics: mbh, msb for ortl, ort2. If
K(a) contains K(r) or K (bill), then the above-
mentioned individuals are designated as 7-ortl,
Tort2, and rcll in U (a) , where T is r or .bill re-
spectively.
But it should be noticed that subdrs don't rep-
resent actual entities in K. So we assume that K
contains the condition -iexist(sd) for an arbitrary
subdr sd of K. We also call subdrs non-actual drs.
4.2 Quantifying-In
Fig.4
In this case, we assume that a special kind of
couterpart relation called representation relation
exists between ort and mbh, and ort and msb. It's
represented as Repr(ort,mbh), Repr(ort, msb). In
general, Repr (a, ,(3) means that is a only with a
special kind of a's properties.
The semantic properties of Repr is formalized as
follows:
	
(24) a) s	 Repr, i , i; l >.
b) s	 Repr, i , j; 1 >, s	 Repr, j, k; 1
s	 Repr, k; 1 >.
c) s	 Repr, j; 1 >, s i= in f	 s	 in fi .
d) s	 Repr, dl, e;1 >,
s	 Repr, d2, e; 1 ><=,d1,d2; 1 >.
a), b) are general conditions of counterpart rela-
tion. d) excludes the cases as in (23).
Now, we can make the following semantic infer-
ence:
(25) f i	 Repr,ort,mbh; 1 >,
fi	 Bel , r, < spy, mbh; 1 >; 1 >
	
f i	 A, < Repr, ort, mbh; 1 >,
< Bel, r, < spy, mbh; 1 >; 1 >; 1 >
	
fi	 3x, < A, < Repr, ort, x; 1 >,
< Bel, r,< spy, x;1 >; 1
 >;1 >;1 >
The DRS condition to which (25) corresponds is
(26) 3x(Repr(ort, x) A Bel(r, spy(x))).
Likewise,
(27) 3x(Repr(ort, x) A Bel(r, -ispy(x)))
is inferred. Further, we can infer
(28) 3x(Ortcutt(ort) A Repr(ort, x) A
Bel(r, spy(x))),
3x(Ortcutt(ort) A Repr(ort, x) A
Bel(r, -ispy(x))).
K (fi):
The situation of (22) is represented by the following
	 If Ortcutt(ort) A Repr(ort, x) is abbreviated to
DRS:	 R(Ortcutt, ort, x), (28) amounts to
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(29) axR(Ortcutt, ort, x) A B el(r spy(x))),
axR(Ortcutt, ort, x) A Bel(r,--ispy(x))).
Their natural language expression is
(30) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy, and he
believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
It's almost self-contradictory. But the real contra-
diction is
(31) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and is not
a spy,
and not (30). SCD can also distinguish such cases.
4.3 Hob-Nob sentence
The so-called Hob-Nob sentence
(32) Hob believes that a witch killed his cow, and
Nob believes that she poisoned his pig
has two problems. If (32) is formulated as
(33) Bel(h, 3x(witch(x) A kc(x)))A Bel(n, she(x) A
pp(x)),
the existential quantifier cannot bind the occur-
rence x' in she(x)' (`kc', `pp' stand for 'killed
his cow', 'poisoned his pig' respectively.) On the
other hand, if (32) is formulated as
(34) ax(witch,(x) A Bel(h, kc(x)) A
she(x) A Bel(n,pp(x))),
it implies that the witch actually exists. In SCD,
(32) is formulated like (34). But the problem with
(34) is solved by means of non-actual drs. Suppose
that the original statements of Hob and Nob are
the following:
(35) (a) Hob: Urgl killed my cow.
(b) Nob: Urgl poisoned my pig.
The DRS which infers a reading of (32) from (35)
is illustrated as follows:8
K(fi):
Fig.5
(32) is inferred from (35) as follows:
(36) 1. f ih
	 Ur gl , d; 1 > A < kc, d; 1 > .
C K(f i)
	2. fin	 Urgl,e; 1 > A < pp, e; 1 > .
3. fin <=,d, e, 1
 >.	 ditto
4. fi	 witch, d; 1 >.	 ditto
5. fih	 kc, d; 1 >.	 1.
6. fi	 Bel , h, < kc, d; 1 >; 1 >	 5.
7. fi	 Repr, d, d; 1 >.	 (24a)
8. fi	 witch, d; 1 > A < Repr, d,d; 1 > A
< B el, h , < kc, d; 1 >; 1 >.	 „ 7.
9. fin	 pp, e; 1 >.	 2.
10. fin	 pp, d; 1 >.	 3, 9
11. fi	 Bel ,n, < pp, d; 1 >; 1 >.	 9.
12. fi H< she, x; 1 >.	 intr. of anaphora
13. fi	 d; 1 >.	 ditto
14. fi	 she, d; 1 >.	 12, 13.
15. fi	 she, d; 1 > A < Repr,d,d; 1 > A
< Bel , n, < pp, d; 1 >; 1 >.
	
7, 11, 14.
16. fi	 x , << witch, d; 1 > A
< Repr, , d, x; 1 > A < Bel, h, < kc, x; 1 >
; 1 > A
< she, d; 1 > A < Repr, d, x; 1 > A
< Bel, n, < pp, x; 1 >; 1 >; 1 >; 1 >. 8, 15.
The K(fi) condition corresponding to (36.16) is
(37) 3x(R(witch, d, x) A Bel(h, kc(x)) A
R(she, d, x) A Bel(n,pp(x))),
and the natural language sentence corresponding
to (37) is (32).
`d', e' are non-actual drs which stem from Hob's
and Nob's belief respectively, and K(fi) contains
`--,exist(d)' and '--iexist(e)' , and the existential
quantification is instantiated by `d', which captures
the non-actuality of the witch.
4.4 Conway paradox
Conway paradox is known as an example which
shows a difference between the private and the com-
mon knowledge. In [3], it's stated as follows:
(38) Claire and Max play poker, and both of them
have an ace. Then they believe
(i) Claire or Max has an ace.
Dana comes along, and asks them if they know
whether the other has an ace. They answer
(ii) No.
Dana says:
(iii) "At least one of you has an ace",
and repeats the same question. They answer
(iv) No.
• But then Claire infers as follows:
h, n; d,e
Bel(h,Urgl (d) A kc(d))
Bel(n, Ur gl(e) A pp(e))
witch(d),
--,exist(e)
Bel(n, d = e).
Semantics of Cooperative Dialogues
(inf.) If Max doesn't know that I have an ace,
having heard that one of us does, he must
have an ace.
At first sight, (i) and (iii) seem to carry the same
information. But the former is a private knowledge,
the latter a common one, which enables Claire
(inf.). But (inf.) is by no means a paradox, but
an adequate inference. In SCD, it's formulated as
follows:
First, (38) from the viewpoint of Claire is repre-
sented by the following DRS conditions:
(39) (i') Bel(cl,cla V mxa)
(ii') a) --,Bel(cl,mxa),
(ii') b) Bel(cl,-.Bel(mx,c1a))
(iii') a) Bel(cl, cla V mxa)
(iii') b) Bel(mx, cla V mxa)
(iv') a) --.Bel(cl,mxa),
(iv') b) Bel(c1,-,Bel(mx,c1a))
Further,
(40) Bel(mx, mxa) V Bel(mx, mxa)
is assumed. (Notation: ci:Claire; mx:Max;
has(Max,ace):mxa; --,has(Max,ace):mxa, etc.)
Then, the Claire's conclusion in (inf.) is semanti-
cally inferred from (39), (40) as follows:
(41) cl	 fe/((39ii'b)) =
cl	 Bel, cl, < Bel, mx, cla; 0 >; 1 >
• cicl	 Bel,mx,cla; o >
cl	 Bel,mx,cla; 0 >
clmx	 cla. ... (a)
(Notation: cla :< has, cl, ace; 1 >. Likewise
mxa,n—rxa.)
el	 f ci((39iii/b)) =
cl	 Bel, mx, cla V mxa; 1 >
clmx cla V mxa.	 (b)
ci	 f ci ((40)) =
cl	 v, < Bel,mx,mxa; 1 >,
< Bel, mx, mxa; 1 >; 1 >	 (c)
(38inf.): Assume that clmx	 mxa.... (d)
From (b), clmx <--4,m---7,cla; 1 >.	 (e)
From (d),(e) clmx	 cla.	 (f)
(f) contradicts (a). Therefore
clmx	 (g)
Assume that cimx mxa. (h)
Under canonical situations, the following
holds:
From (h), cl	 Bel, mx,mxa; 0 >.	 (i)
From (g), ci	 Bel,mx,n—tiei; 0 >.	 (j)
From (i),(j), cl	 A, < Bel, mx, mxa; 0 >,
• Bel,mx,mxa; 0 >; 1 >.
cl	 V, < Bel,mx,mxa; 1 >,
< Bel, mx, t-rit; 1 >; 0 >.	 (k)
(k) contradicts (c). Therefore clmx mxa.
Notice that (41b), i.e. 'Claire or Max has an ace.'
as a common knowledge, plays an essential role in
the inference.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I formulated a semantic framework
for [18] which satisfies the properties in (1), and
proposed a solution of some linguistic problems us-
ing it.
But the following themes should be studied fur-
ther:
i) Adequate systematization of knowledge in di-
alogues in order to make precise the mechanism
of DRS revision.
ii) The ontological status of discourse referents
must be clarified, not only in its absolute char-
acters, but also in its relational characters such
as counterpart relation, intentional identity.
iii) Refinement of the algorithm of belief revision.
iv) Clarification of degree of belief-sharing in a di-
alogue as in [19].
Notes
1 Form(L) and DRS (L) below are co-inductively
defined. As to the co-inductive definition, see [4].
2 Precisely, a, b must be ai, bi, i.e. a, b at the time
point i. But they are normally represented by a, b.
3 As to hypersets, see [4].
4 Quantifiers and logical connectives are given a
more sophisticated DRS-representation and inter-
pretation in the DRT literature. But it's not the
subject here.
5 It's considered as a semantic version of the re-
vision algorithm presented in [18]. Further, cf.
[7, 8, 10, 21].
6 The terminological distinction between 'nega-
tion' and 'denial' is based on [4].
7 It should not be confused with the accessibility
of drs in a parent DRS from its subDRSs.
8 Precisely, 'd', 'e' must be 'he' and 'ne' in UK-(p).
But for simplicity, I identify them. They are re-
lated via "horizontal" link between them. (Cf.
"intentional identity" in [9], "internal anchor" in
[12].), which contrasts with "vertical" link like
counterpart relation. But this subject is to be
considered on another occasion.
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